The path to international recognition of Somaliland

Is Taiwan the path to international recognition of
Somaliland or is it a strategic mistake?

*Nimcan Aidid 

Introduction:

 It is not a territory seeking to secede from the mother country as some believe, but Somaliland was a former British protectorate that gained its independence on June 26, 1960, after a long period of struggle against the British colonialist, almost five days after its independence, it voluntarily joined its neighbor Italian Somalia in the hope of uniting all Somali territory, which was divided by colonialism and fragmented among them for the strategic location of Somali region in the Horn of Africa, where it controls the security of sea lanes such as the Strait of Bab al-Mandab across the Gulf of Aden, and on the way to the Indian Ocean.

Although the goal was achieved by uniting both sides, Somaliland was not satisfied with the representation it had received in the newly formed government, these dissatisfaction increased with the rise of Siad Barre, President of Somalia who later turned into a dictator which led to the formation of the armed movement of (Somali National Movement)  in 1981 in Somaliland with the aim of overthrowing Barre. In response to the formation of the armed movement, Berri launched a brutal war that resulted in an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 deaths,this ignited a dispute between the two sides and led to the latter’s separation.

Although Somaliland has fulfilled all the abstract symbols of statehood, the international community has not recognized Somaliland as an independent entity, in this article we will talk about the main obstacles to recognition of Somaliland. In addition, we will discuss the growing relationship between Taiwan and Somaliland, focusing on the pros and cons that Somaliland can derive from the relationship with Taiwan, especially since the second most powerful government in the world can influence the Somaliland issue.

Somaliland’s case Backgroundٍ:

The Republic of Somaliland in related to the territory, boundaries and people of the former British Somaliland Protectorate, which was established in international law by a series of international treaties signed between 1888 and 1897,Somaliland located in the Horn of Africaand shares its western borders with the Republic of Djibouti, its southern borders with the Federal Republic of Ethiopia, and its eastern borders with the Federal State of Somalia. It is also bordered to the north by the coast on the Gulf of Aden by about 850 km.[1]

The history of Somaliland can be traced back to the establishment of British colonial rule in 1884, except for a brief occupation of Italy (1940-1941) after the Second World War, the region remained under British control until 26 June 1960, when it received its independence as the State of Somaliland. The new Somaliland state was recognized by 35 governments, moreover Somaliland was registered by the United Nations. Just five days after independence, Somaliland merged with the former Italian colony, the Italian Trust Territory of Somalia, in the spirit of inclusive Somali nationalism.[2]

Somaliland preferred its independence over its voluntary integration withthe Italian Somali neighbor because the Somali people are one sharing the Somali language, religion (Sunni Islam), the traditional system of living based on nomadic pastoralism.So the opinion of Somalilanders, at that time like other African and Arab countries liberated from colonialism, was the rejection of the ideas of colonialism, and the unification of all the five Somali territory was directed by Somaliland, a decision that the Somaliland people later regretted since then because they felt insulted from the beginning of the integration almost, the unfair distribution of powers and their expulsion About the emerging state in favor of the south.[3]

Although the goal was achieved by uniting both sides, Somaliland was not satisfied with the representation it had received in the newly formed government. Not only is the capital chosen to be in the south, but also that the president and prime minister are southerners. In addition, these two regions were ruled by two different colonial powers, and thus two regions produced largely incompatible administrative, economic, and legal systems, as well as divergent orientations and interests of the political elites. Exactly a year later, in June 1961, the dissatisfaction grew even more so that the people of Somaliland vetoed against the unified constitution and also tried to regain their independence through a failed coup.[4]

In 1969, General Mohamed Siad Barre launched a military coup and took power, After the military seized power, prejudice against northerners became the official policy of the state, which translated into a systematic exclusion that permeated all aspects of state functions, and eventually the Isaac clans was identified as a major target of exclusion, which led to the emergence of the Somali National Movement (SNM), which has its bases in Ethiopia In 1982 it enjoyed the support of the majority of the population in the former British protectorate of Somaliland. By the end of the eighties, the national movement launched a guerrilla war against the government forces, which gave the regime the excuse it was looking for, and after the failure of the Siad Barre government to cleanse the moral and material support of the Somali National Movement in the north, the military council immediately and indiscriminately used its means and resources to launch raids and bombing campaigns to assert its control over northern Somalia (present-day Somaliland) but eventually, after a decade, the fire spread to Mogadishu, and my father provided a greater opportunity for the movement of the northern national movement that came to dominate throughout the north.[5]

As a result of these confrontations and crisis, the Somali regime finally collapsed in 1991. On May 18, of the same year, the Somali National Movement declared without prior notice the independence of Somaliland within the borders it had inherited from the British government on June 26, 1960 as an independent state, leaving Somaliland and its people free In determining their political destiny, unlike Somalia that still struggling to form a coherent state system until now (2022).

Somaliland’s independence was restored on May 18, 1991 and delegated to the Somali National Movement (SNM) to rule for two years – the transitional period – its two-year rule was marked by internal unrest within the ranks of the Somali National Movement and the spread of the influence of clan militias. However, during this short period, the SNM management was also able to oversee an unprecedented process of dialogue and reconciliation between Somaliland (tribes and sub-clan), before handing over power to a civilian government in 1993 at the Borama Conference.[6]

The main obstacles to recognition of Somaliland

Somaliland has done its best to convince the international community that it is truly an independent state, and thus has acquired all the abstract symbols of the state – the flag, the national anthem, the currency, as well as the vehicle license plates – and more than that the tangible features of the state: a specific territory, population, and system of government And relations, albeit limited, with other countries. Perhaps most importantly, Somaliland has generally succeeded in maintaining a degree of peace and stability unknown in other parts of Somalia. This achievement, more than any other, has maintained a degree of international interest and participation despite resistance to Somaliland’s aspirations for an independent state. The adoption of a democratic constitution, successful local elections in 2002, and credible presidential elections in 2003 followed by parliamentary and presidential elections, despite delays at some times,reinforced this trend, attracting foreign aid and sympathy with Somaliland despite repeated international assurances of Somalia’s unity and territorial integrity.[7]

Therefore, Somaliland did not obtain official international recognition as an independent and sovereign state, although next May 2022 will marked the 31st anniversary of Somaliland’s declaration of independence, and this indicates that there are real obstacles limiting the achievement of Somaliland’s goal, and among the most important of these obstacles are the following:

• legal obstacles

Hasty integration In 1960: Somaliland merged with the former Italian colony immediately after independence nearly five days later, in the spirit of inclusive Somali nationalism. Although this union has many shortcomings, as we will discuss later, it still hampers the Somaliland issue.[8]

Somaliland declaration unilaterally: the lack of clarity of self-determination in international law regarding separation from post-colonial states, although scholars agree that the right to self-determination guarantees colonial peoples the possibility of forming states independent of their colonial rulers, the principle is less clear Concerning the separation from post-colonial countries. Because the Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples is based on the principle of self-determination to justify decolonization. Therefore, the right to self-determination in Somaliland is offset by the territorial integrity of Somalia, despite the use of colonial borders to form independent states was a principle supported by the Organization of the African Union.[9]

• political obstacles

The African Union adhered to the stated policies and rejected any separatist attempt on the continent on the pretext that it opens the way as a result of the existing border conflicts across the continent despite the fact that the African Union sent a fact-finding mission to Somaliland in 2005, which was recommended in its report The final recognition of Somaliland as an independent state, and the report stated that “the union that took place in 1960 between Somaliland and the Somalia caused immense grievances and suffering to the people of the Somaliland region.” However, that report was not presented in the ministerial discussions of the African Union, but this policy did not prevent Eritrea and South Sudan from obtaining On the right to self-determination and then independence.

Cultural and ethnic homogeneity appears to be the strongest link that maintains cohesion and unity between the two parts, North and South, and poses a cultural, philosophical and political challenge to attempts to recognize “Somaliland” as an independent state in the Horn of Africa.[10]

• internal obstacles

There are some internal factors that hinder the goal of Somaliland, some of which are due to the political elite and their prevailing beliefs in how to treat the issue of Somaliland, as in the first decade of the life of Somaliland, where Somaliland leaders believed in alliance with the West, especially the United States of America and the United Kingdom to obtain its aim of Internationalrecognition, and there are also some tribes or what is called the tribes of the parties in reference to their peripheral location in Somaliland, some of them are not convinced of the idea of re-establishing Somaliland again, and support belonging to Somalia.

In addition to the above challenges, Somaliland has made two strategic mistakes that have been attributed to all of the above factors.and these two strategic mistakes are the following:

1. Immediate, emotional and unsecured unity: Although unification was under discussion with the leaders of the two newly independent regions, the merger and the unification were poorly prepared, There is not enough time since the period between the declaration of unity in April 1960 and its implementation in July 1960 is only two months, and then there is no special committee tasked with preparing the necessary arrangements for the unification of the two countries as the political leaders in two regions focused on the procedures for receiving the administrative and political authorities from the colonial administrations,and both parliaments approved various laws of the union, But most importantly, the unity agreement did not deal with how to distribute power between the two regions, but rather dealt with general issues related to the legislative capital. Council, Constitutional laws and institutions, rights and duties of citizens, nationality, army, police, finance and customs. In this regard this hasty integration is what prompted the collapse of the Somali Democratic Republic after thirty years of independence.[11]

As a result, early dissatisfaction with the arrangements negotiated by Somaliland’s leaders led northern voters to reject the unified constitution in a referendum in June 1961. In October 1962, northern ministers resigned from the government and after several days northern representatives withdrew from the National Assembly and threatened to boycott it. In any case, the situation changed when the civil administration of the republic was terminated by army officers who managed to overthrow the civilian government.[12] and as noted Harriet Gorka talking about merging Northerners can in no way claim that the 1960 merger with the South was a shotgun wedding By all accounts, the unification was widely popular. Northerners could argue, however that they requested the annulment of the union before their honeymoon and that their request was unjustly rejected.

2. Somaliland’s Self-determination: Thirty years of dissatisfaction of the people of Somaliland and after the collapse of the Somali Republic due to the abuse of power by dictator Bari and the suffering of the people of Somaliland, the Somali National Movement (SNM) without prior notice declared the independence of Somaliland within the borders of the former Somaliland stateWithout adequate consideration of the situation in Somalia at that time, and without asking whether or not the people of Somaliland had the right to self-determination, or even if Somaliland could return to its original state.This may be the reason why the people of Somaliland took another thirty years without international recognition.

Taiwan an opportunity or a challenge?

In 2020, the two strategic autonomous regions, Taiwan (Republic of China) and Somaliland, announced that they had established a formal relationship with each other with the aim of expanding their contact with the outside world, which represents – in their view Interests – a diplomatic victory for both sides, a paradigm shift that will have repercussions on the Horn of Africa and Somaliland, as well as the major powers, especially China, which expressed their rejection of that step, instead of the United States welcoming this diplomacy. the clash between the two sides, which made some observers see that they are sponsored by “American”. This development warns of potential dangers affecting all parties in the region in light of the different positions of the concluded agreement. And it could lead to a shift in Chinese policy towards Somaliland in particular and the Horn of Africa in general during the coming period.[13]

According to the Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, exchanges between Taiwan and Somaliland began in 2009 during the beginning of the administration of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), and there are many areas of cooperation between them to include issues such as enhancing maritime security, health care and education. And in February 2020, they signed a major strategic agreement, according to which it was decided to establish mutual representative offices, and it was not announced until July of the same year. Mohamed Haj was appointed as the representative of Somaliland in Taipei, while the latter appointed Lou Chen-hwa (羅震華), as its representative in Hargeisa. It also aims to build bridges of cooperation on common issues to strengthen political, social and economic ties between the two sides, and to focus new relations on the fields of agriculture, education, energy, fisheries, health, information, communications and mining.

Taiwan and Somaliland share fairly similar geopolitical conditions, which makes the new pairing seem normal. this new bilateral relationship, which faces similar diplomatic quandaries, is largely not recognized by the international community, not even by UN member states, and Taipei and Hargeisa have found cause for partnership in their common struggle against neighboring adversaries – China and Somalia, respectively. Taiwan is also preparing to work with Somaliland to contribute to peace, security and economic development in the Horn of Africa.[14]

Common values and interests

There are similarities between these two countries, as pointed out by the Taiwanese President and expressed the similarity in common values, and the Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed that Somaliland is a country that possesses the concepts of freedom and democracy like Taiwan. Hence, Taiwan and Somaliland are functioning democracies in their respective regions. Both are self-governing, struggling for international recognition, and surviving in the shadow of larger “mother” states that do not accept their political independence.[15]

In addition both regions lie in geostrategic significant areas and are therefore essential for outside powers striving for influence. Taiwan is located off the coast of the Chinese mainland and is important to US military strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. Somaliland is a southern neighbor of Djibouti, as well as Ethiopia, located Gulf of Adennear the Bab el-Mandeb strait important to global shipping and energy supply. Such a critical geopolitical location allows these two regions to find willing external partners for support. In the past few years, China has gained a strong foothold in the Horn of Africa (such as establishing a military base in Djibouti and major investments in Ethiopia) however the choice of Somaliland for Taiwan over China is significant. It was a rare success for Taiwanese diplomacy in the diplomatic recognition game being played with China.[16]

Furthermore, Taiwan and Somaliland share somewhat similar geopolitical circumstances, which makes the new pairing quite normal. They are largely unrecognized by the international community – even UN member states – although both countries host and representative offices in many countries: Taiwan is unofficially represented in 15 countries, while Somaliland has representative offices in 22 countries around the world.

Driving factors for relations between Taiwan and Somaliland

First and foremost, the mutual recognition between the two countries is one of the strongest motives that push both Somaliland and Taiwan to inaugurate representative offices between them, as the latter seeks to start a new phase of gaining new, unlikely allies with China after four consecutive years of losing where Taiwan lost diplomatic recognition rapidly since 2016, for example, Taiwan has lost burkina faso, Kiribati, and the Solomon Islands, and this new development in the Horn of Africa is likely to give a diplomatic boost to Taiwanese diplomacy. Therefore, this is a step on the way to escape from Chinese pressures, which restricted the margin of maneuver available for Taiwan in many regions of the world, and managed to tempt a third of Taiwan’s allies to cut ties with it, leaving only 15 countries that recognize it.[17]

Also, Somaliland continues to achieve international recognition, and seeks to improve its relations with Taiwan indicates Somaliland’s interest in building relations with the United States of America instead of China in the midst of the ongoing trade war between them, as it sees that Washington has historically been the security guarantor of Taiwan against the threat of invasion. And benefit from US protection in accordance with the “Taipei” law passed by the US Congress on March 26, 2020, which is concerned with protecting and strengthening Taiwan’s international allies in response to China’s policy that prevents other countries from recognizing or maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[18]

In additionSomaliland hopes, from its relationship with Taiwan, to benefit from Taiwan’s experiences regarding how it can deal with its diplomatic status. Over the decades, Taiwan has been able to establish strong and informal relations with some countries such as the United States and Japan, and then it can benefit Somaliland with its experience in developing informal relations with international and regional players. The matter could develop into building relations with international organizations that Taiwan has struggled to join in the recent period. Somaliland can follow in Taiwan’s footsteps to achieve success in joining the World Health Organization.

There are also commercial interests and mutual opportunities, as Taiwan aspires to benefit from the port of Berbera economically and commercially, and to exploit Somaliland’s rich mineral resources, including significant untapped oil and gas potential. Investment in these sectors by Taiwanese companies and entrepreneurs could be profitable. and Somaliland that deprived of foreign investment, may benefit from Taiwan’s capabilities in many sectors such as health, technological progress, the maritime sector, oil and gas, etc., and obtain more aid, as Taiwan is larger than all of its diplomatic allies in terms of the size of its economy and population.[19]

Somalia recognizes the one-China policy and hosts the Chinese Embassy in Mogadishu and participates in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Interestingly, before the civil war in the 1980s, Somalia was the first East African country to recognize the People’s Republic of China and lobbied in favor of the People’s Republic of China. For China’s seat on the Security Council. Since 2014, bilateral relations have grown rapidly, and China has been an active participant in the international efforts to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia. In the past few years, China has intensified its engagement with Africa and is actively working to expand its economic, military, and diplomatic reach in the Western Indian Ocean (WIO). Somalia’s geostrategic position will be beneficial to China’s strategy in WIO. Therefore, as China-Somalia ties deepen, Somaliland and Taiwan have found reasons to strengthen their relationship, partly as a response to the China-Somalia relationship and partly, to build ties with as many willing partners as possible.[20]

finally, both Taiwan and Somaliland are driven by a desire for mutual and international support to meet the political and security challenges posed by their larger neighbors – China and Somalia. Both the Taiwanese Foreign Ministry and the President of Somaliland have stated that there are external pressures and mutual cooperation is required. As the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa become focal points of regional rivalry and great power competition, both Taipei and Hargeisa, with their stable democracies, hope to draw a clear contrast to China’s expansionist behavior in the region and the corrupt and chaotic situation in Somalia, respectively.As a result, Taipei and Hargeisa have found common cause in creating new paths to break out of their global diplomatic isolation and gain greater international recognition.[21]

Chinese pressure and potential risks:

The rivalry between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (Taiwan) over which entity should be recognized in international affairs which would represent the central Chinese government to adopt the “one-China policy”, which means recognizing the demands of one of the two governments, and with the one-China policy as the standard In international relations, China has encouraged its diplomatic isolation by forcing international partners to choose between it and its rival. As a result, the number of countries recognizing China increased from 48 in 1969 to 180 in 2019, while the number of countries recognizing Taiwan decreased from 71 to only 15 during the same period. The erosion of Taiwan’s international and diplomatic standing is due to China’s aggressive “dollar diplomacy” with the former communist and socialist countries of Asia and Africa after the Cold War.

consequence of one-China policy, the Chinese ambassador to Somalia visited Somaliland in August 2020 for the third time after Somaliland and Taiwan declaring formal relationship with each other in July 2020, to present development packages to Somaliland, including road and airport construction On the condition of severing ties with Taiwan and adopting the one-China policy.[22]

China sees diplomatic relations between Somaliland and Taiwan as a threat to the Maritime Silk Road project in the Horn of Africa. The Gulf of Aden, which borders Somaliland to the north, is of vital strategic importance to the Chinese and global economy because ships from Asia must pass through it to reach the Suez Canal. Thus, China has a long-term interest in securing the sea lanes used for trade, logistics, and navies in those waterways.[23]

Thus, Somaliland may pay a heavy price for defying China and establishing relations with Taiwan. Beijing could stand in the way of any attempt by Somaliland to achieve international recognition as China has significant influence in Africa, as well as use its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council to prevent Somaliland from joining the international organization. Fears are also growing that China will support and arm the central government in Mogadishu to gain a qualitative advantage over Somaliland.

Conclusion:

Somaliland is a defacto state that has completed all the components of a contemporary state, but it lacks the element of international recognition, as not a single state has recognized it with the passage of more than thirty years, as people of Somaliland have not limited their efforts and left no door except to knock on it. Hence, we know the extent of the difficulties that prevent Somaliland from international recognition, including legal and political obstacles, in addition to internal obstacles.

Furthermore, Somaliland suffers from strategic mistakes that have long repercussions on the peoples of Somaliland, such as Immediate, emotional and unsecured unity with Somalia and then, after thirty years of dissatisfaction of the people of Somaliland and after the collapse of the Somali Republic due to the abuse of power by dictator Bari and the suffering of the people of Somaliland, the Somali National Movement (SNM) without prior notice declared the independence of Somaliland within the borders of the former Somaliland state Without adequate consideration of the situation in Somalia at that time, and without asking whether or not the people of Somaliland had the right to self-determination, or even if Somaliland could return to its original state.This may be the reason why the people of Somaliland took another thirty years without international recognition.

At present, Somaliland has declared relations with Taiwan, although there are reasons for these relations like sharing of somewhat similar geopolitical conditions in both Somaliland and Taiwan, which may justify relations, as well as the independence of Somaliland in the formulation of its foreign policy,but Somaliland may pay a heavy price for defying China and establishing relations with Taiwan. Beijing could stand in the way of any attempt by Somaliland to achieve international recognition as China has significant influence in Africa, as well as use its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council to prevent Somaliland from joining the international organization. Fears are also growing that China will support and arm the central government in Mogadishu to gain a qualitative advantage over Somaliland.

Therefore, the decision-makers of Somaliland must not display and maneuver in front of a global pole (China) in order to avoid unfavorable consequences and strategic mistakes that will be long overdue

.[1]. Matt Bryden “State-Within-a-Failed-State: Somaliland and the Challenge of International

Recognition”, Palgrave Macmillan, New york, January,2004, Chp 10, P 169,

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057/9781403981011_11.pdf

[2]Nasir M. Ali, “Overcoming Diplomatic Isolation: Forging a New Somaliland Approach”, the Social

Research and Development Institute, P 06, (https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjNkPzw_Y32AhWphP0HHdfRD1AQFnoECAgQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fsoradi.org%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2018%2F08%2FPaper-One-Overcoming-Diplomatic-Isolation-Forging-a-New-Somalila).

[3]. Adam Haji-Ali Ahmed, “Legal Aspects of Somaliland Case in the New Engagement

Policy with Somalia”, the Social Research and Development Institute, P 21,

https://ke.boell.org/sites/default/files/somaliland_statehood_recognition_and_the_ongoing_dialogue_wi

th_somalia.pdf

[4]. Harriet Gorka, “SOMALILAND – A WALK ON THIN ICE”, KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, 2011, p 81, (https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjGscS6mIH2AhU0QEEAHe0aABQQFnoECA4QAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.kas.de%2Fwf%2Fdoc%2Fkas_23326-544-2-30.pdf%3F110708081717&usg=AOvVaw3kLwO1G6x8QAd3rR8KuhOc)

[5].Ismail Laddaf, “The Somali Talks and the Somaliland Case” the Social Research and Development

Institute, P 59,

https://ke.boell.org/sites/default/files/somaliland_statehood_recognition_and_the_ongoing_dialogue_wi

th_somalia.pdf

[6]. Same as the first reference.

[7].Matt Bryden “State-Within-a-Failed-State: Somaliland and the Challenge of International

Recognition”, Palgrave Macmillan, New york, January,2004, Chp 10, P 103,

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057/9781403981011_11.pdf

[8]. Adam Haji-Ali Ahmed, “Legal Aspects of Somaliland Case in the New Engagement Policy with Somalia”, (https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjOta7lh472AhWHg_0HHbF2CbMQFnoECAYQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fsoradi.org%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2018%2F08%2FPaper-Two-Legal-Aspects-of-Somaliland-Case-in-the-New-Engagement)

[9].  Harriet Gorka, “SOMALILAND – A WALK ON THIN ICE”, KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, 2011, p 81, (https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjGscS6mIH2AhU0QEEAHe0aABQQFnoECA4QAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.kas.de%2Fwf%2Fdoc%2Fkas_23326-544-2-30.pdf%3F110708081717&usg=AOvVaw3kLwO1G6x8QAd3rR8KuhOc).

[10]. الشافعي ابتدون، “المفاوضات بين الصومال وصومالي الند: المسار الوعر والمستقبل الغامض”، 12مارس، 2020دراسات الجزيرة.

https://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/article/4599

[11]. محمد أحمد الشيخ علي، “الصومال في مرحلة ما بعد تفكك الدولة: دور القبيلة والمجتمع الدولي والمجتمع المدني في الفترة من 1999 – 1991م”جامعة الخرطوم،معهد الدراسات لإفريقية ولآسيوية، 2003.

[12].Adam Haji-Ali Ahmed, “Legal Aspects of Somaliland Case in the New Engagement Policy with Somalia”, p 6, (https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjOta7lh472AhWHg_0HHbF2CbMQFnoECAYQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fsoradi.org%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2018%2F08%2FPaper-Two-Legal-Aspects-of-Somaliland-Case-in-the-New-Engagement

[13]. Ahmad Askar,”Taiwan-Somaliland Relations: Impact on the Future of Chinese Influence in the Horn of Africa”, Emirates Policy Center (EPC),9 Aug 2020. https://epc.ae/en/details/featured/taiwan-somaliland-relations-impact-on-the-future-of-chinese-influence-in-the-horn-of-africa

[14]. I-wei Jennifer Chang,”Somaliland: Taiwan’s Breakthrough in the Horn of Africa”,Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 19,p 5.https://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/GTB-PDF-5.19_v2.pdf

[15]. Same as the first reference.

[16].Dr. Sankalp Gurjar,”Taiwan-Somaliland Relationship and the Geopolitical Competition in the Red Sea”,Indian Council of World Affairs,Sapru House, New Delhi, 01 September 2020. https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=5317&lid=3747

[17].Same as the first reference.

[18].  Ahmad Askar,”Taiwan-Somaliland Relations: Impact on the Future of Chinese Influence in the Horn of Africa”, Emirates Policy Center (EPC),9 Aug 2020. https://epc.ae/en/details/featured/taiwan-somaliland-relations-impact-on-the-future-of-chinese-influence-in-the-horn-of-africa

[19].Same as the first reference.

[20]. Dr. Sankalp Gurjar,”Taiwan-Somaliland Relationship and the Geopolitical Competition in the Red Sea”,Indian Council of World Affairs,Sapru House, New Delhi, 01 September 2020. https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=5317&lid=3747

[21].  I-wei Jennifer Chang,”Somaliland: Taiwan’s Breakthrough in the Horn of Africa”,Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 19,p 6.https://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/GTB-PDF-5.19_v2.pdf

[22].Guled Ahmed,”Taiwan should implement the “Economic Miracle” model in Somaliland to win Africa’s goodwill”, middle east institute, September 2, 202. https://www.mei.edu/publications/taiwan-should-implement-economic-miracle-model-somaliland-win-africas-goodwill

[23]. Same as the first reference.

*Nimcan Aidid is a researcher and currently student in the department of political science, faculty of African postgraduate Studies, Cairo university. the author received his undergraduate degree from the University of Cairo faculty of economic and political science.